I. CLAIMS AND CLAIMANTS A.What are the state statutes and most significant appellate decisions which provide remedies for: (1) unfair competition, and (2) false or deceptive advertising. The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), Connecticut General Statutes §§ 42-110a – 42-110q, provides remedies for unfair competition and false or deceptive advertising. See, e.g., Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 756, 474 A.2d 780, 786 (1984). The Supreme Court of Connecticut has also set forth that the common law provides remedies for such conduct. See Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 501 n.23, 656 A.2d 1009, 1022 n.23 (1995). B. What specific acts or practices are prohibited by these statutes and decisions? Specifically, CUTPA prohibits "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b(a). In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has adopted the "cigarette rule" of the Federal Trade Commission. The three factors of the cigarette rule are as follows: (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; and (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, competitors, or other businessmen. See Web Press Serv. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342, 355, 525 A.2d 57, 64 (1987); Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 492-93, 464 A.2d 847, 852 (1983). The third element of the "cigarette rule" is, itself, subject to a three-part test: (1) the injury must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and (3) it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. See Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 592, 657 A.2d 212, 228 (1995). All three elements of the "cigarette rule" do not have to be met to establish a violation of CUTPA. "A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." Willow Springs Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Seventh BRT, Dev. Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 43, 717 A.2d 77 (1998); see Williams Ford, 232 Conn. 559, 657 A.2d 212; Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80, 106-12, 612 A.2d 1130, 1143-46 (1992). The Supreme Court has set forth that the Federal Trade Commission has identified four primary categories of practices that have been considered unfair: (1) withholding material information; (2) making unsubstantiated advertising claims; (3) using high pressure sales techniques; and (4) depriving consumers of various post-purchase remedies. See A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 216 n.9, 579 A.2d 69, 77 n.9 (1990). Additionally, the Supreme Court has described common law unfair competition as a generic name for a number of related torts involving improper interference with business prospects. See Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 501 n.23, 656 A.2d 1009, 1022 n.23 (1995). These torts include use of a similar trade name, tortious interference with business expectancies, and an unjustifiable interference with any person's right to pursue his or her occupation. See id. C. Who has standing to bring actions under these statutes and decisions, and who does not? E.g., consumers, businesses, competitors, local prosecutors, state attorneys general, etc. Any "person" who suffers an "ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by [CUTPA] may bring an action to recover actual damages." See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(a). "Person" is defined as "a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, and any other legal entity." See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a(3). Additionally, the Commissioner of Consumer Protection may order an investigation into any alleged violations of CUTPA, and hold hearings and issue cease-and-desist orders to any party in violation of CUTPA. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110d. The Connecticut Attorney General may seek temporary and permanent injunctive relief for CUTPA violations. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110d. D. Identify any acts, transactions, parties or other circumstances which are excluded from the scope of these statutes or decisions. CUTPA provides for two specific exceptions. First, CUTPA shall not apply to "[t]ransactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the State or of the United States." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110c(a)(1). Second, CUTPA shall not apply to "acts done by the publisher, owner, agent or employee of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television station in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement, where the publisher, owner, agent or employee did not have knowledge of the false, misleading, unfair or deceptive character of the advertisement, and did not have direct financial interest in the sale or distribution of the advertised product or service." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110c(a)(2). There are also implied exceptions to CUTPA, such as cases involving the purchase and sale of securities. See Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 200 Conn. 172, 510 A.2d 972 (1986). Connecticut does not recognize a common law cause of action for the tort of disparagement/trade libel. See National Distributor Sys., Inc. v. Steinis, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1661 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 25, 1999). II. REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES A. What remedies are allowed under these statutes and decisions? Do remedies vary depending upon the parties' standing or the nature of the transaction? CUTPA provides for relief in the form of both actual damages and injunctive relief. A person may seek both actual damages and injunctive relief for violations of CUTPA. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110g(a) and 42-110g(d). The Commissioner of Consumer Protection and the Connecticut Attorney General may seek temporary restraining orders or temporary or permanent injunctive relief. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110d and 42-110m. B. Are award of punitive damages or multipliers possible, and if so, what are the requirements and burdens of proof? Courts have discretionary authority to award punitive damages for violations of CUTPA. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(a). CUTPA does not set forth in what circumstances punitive damages are to be awarded or how they are to be measured. Courts, too, have deviated in the measure of punitive damages. See Ford v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 59 n.4, 578 A.2d 1054, 1063 n.4 (1990) (double attorneys' fees); Tessman v. Tiger Lee Constr. Co., 228 Conn. 42, 634 A.2d 870 (1993) (equal to actual damages). C. Are nominal damages allowed irrespective of proof of actual harm? If so, describe the damages and the circumstances under which they may be awarded. CUTPA does allow for an award of nominal damages irrespective of proof of actual harm. Although a plaintiff must prove "ascertainable loss" to maintain a CUTPA claim, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-110g(a), this does not require the plaintiff to prove a specific amount of damages. See Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 232 Conn. 666, 689, 657 A.2d 1087, 1098 (Berdon, J., concurring) (citing Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., 184 Conn. 607, 612-13, 440 A.2d 810 (1981)). "Whenever a consumer has received something other than what he bargained for, he has suffered a loss of money or property. A loss is ascertainable if it is measurable even though the precise amount of the loss is not known." See Rizzo Pool, 232 Conn. 666, 689, 657 A.2d 1087, 1098. The award of nominal damages under CUTPA opens the door to other important remedies, including punitive damages and attorneys' fees. See Calandro v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV 0337064S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3195, at *32 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1998). D. Are class or representative actions allowed or required, and if so, to what extent are the procedures different from other class actions? Class actions are not required, but may be brought by any person entitled to bring an action under CUTPA on behalf of that person and other persons similarly situated who are residents of Connecticut or injured in Connecticut. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(b). As soon as practicable after the commencement of a class action, a court shall determine by order whether the class action may be maintained. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110h. This order may be conditional, and it may be amended before a decision on the merits. See id. The order is also immediately appealable by either party. See id. E. May attorneys' fees be awarded to prevailing parties, and if so, what findings or proofs are required? A court may award attorneys' fees to the plaintiff "based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery." Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110g(d). The award of attorneys' fees is discretionary. See Woronecki v. Trappe, 228 Conn. 574, 580-82, 637 A.2d 783, 786-87 (1994). The appellate court has held that attorneys' fees may be awarded even if it is found that the plaintiff has not suffered actual damages. See Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 794-96, 720 A.2d 242, 258-60 (1998). F. To what extent may actions of the FTC or other agencies, or decisions in other states, be considered by a court in an action under state law? CUTPA specifically provides that Connecticut courts shall, in determining whether an unfair trade practice has occurred in violation of section 42-110b(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, "be guided by interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1))." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(b). G. Describe any unique procedural requirements which arise when litigating under these statutes or decisions. A person who brings an action under CUTPA must mail a copy of the complaint to both the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Consumer Protection. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(c). Additionally, a CUTPA claim must be pled with legally sufficient specificity to allow evaluation of the legal theory of the claim. See, e.g., S.M.S. Textile Mills, Inc. v. Brown, Jacobson, Tillinghast, Lahan & King, P.C., 32 Conn. App. 786, 631 A.2d 340 (1993). The complaint must also allege that the acts complained of were done in the conduct of trade or commerce. See, e.g., Pergament v. Green, 32 Conn. App. 644, 630 A.2d 615 (1993); Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn. App. 660, 613 A.2d 838 (1992). H. What defenses are available, and are any defenses specifically barred? CUTPA does not have any express defenses, but it does contain a three-year statute of limitations. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). Additionally, courts have held that CUTPA claims may be subject to certain contractual limitations, such as an arbitration agreement. See Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 196 n.10, 680 A.2d 1243, 1252 n.10 (1996). A CUTPA claim may also be precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel. See Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 680 A.2ed 1243 (1996) (res judicata); Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712-20, 627 A.2d 374, 377-81 (1993) (collateral estoppel); Duhaime v. American Reserve Life Ins. Co., 200 Conn. 360, 511 A.2d 333 (1986) (res judicata); Norse Sys., Inc. v. Tingley Sys., Inc., 49 Conn. App. 582, 598-99, 715 A.2d 807, 817-18 (1998) (res judicata). Notably, while no defenses are specifically barred by statute, courts have held that a defendant's good faith is not a defense. See Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 209 Conn. 243, 258, 550 A.2d 1061, 1068 (1988); Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 208 Conn. 620, 546 A.2d 805 (1988). Further, it is no defense that a private plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to maintaining a CUTPA action. See Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 186 Conn. 507, 520, 442 A.2d 920, 926 (1982).