Whether the "vandalism" exclusion includes losses caused by arson depends upon the jurisdiction in which the loss occurred – the proverbial "split of authority."  However, lately, it appears that courts are moving toward a majority view that losses caused by arson are a form of vandalism. 

The standard ISO homeowners policy provides coverage for the dwelling and other structures on an all-risk basis except for loss "caused by vandalism and malicious mischief or breakage of glass and safety glazing materials if the dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days immediately before the loss.  A dwelling being constructed is not considered vacant."  The standard ISO dwelling and property policy provides coverage for dwelling and other structures on an all-risk basis but does not insure loss caused by "vandalism and malicious mischief, theft or attempted theft if the dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days immediately before the loss.  A dwelling being constructed is not considered vacant."  

The two most recent cases confronting this issue have concluded that the definition of vandalism includes arson.  In Battishill v. Farmers Alliance Insurance Company, 139 N.M. 24 (2006), the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed whether a policy exclusion for "vandalism" includes losses caused by arson.  In interpreting the common and ordinary meaning of such terms, the Battishill court concluded that arson is a form of vandalism and malicious mischief.  The court also noted that the definition of "arson" and "vandalism" specify a certain state of mind (willful, intentional, malicious, wanton or reckless) and address a certain type of result (destruction, defacement or damage) to property, but does not limit the type of property or extent of damage.  In Bear River Mutual Insurance Company v. Williams, 153 P.3d 798 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the policy language excluded coverage of losses caused by vandalism or malicious mischief regardless of the means used to inflict those losses, even when a loss could be characterized as "arson."  The court looked to the "usually accepted meaning," and did not find any ambiguity.  The Bear River court also noted that damage inflicted with spray paint is not excluded from the definition of vandalism merely because it could be separately categorized as graffiti.

In Connecticut, there is no appellate decision regarding this issue; however, a federal district court and a state Superior Court have reached opposite results.  In Costabile v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 193 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D. Conn. 2002), U.S. District Court Judge Alan H. Nevas, in ruling on the insurer's motion for summary judgment, shed significant light on the question of whether the definition of vandalism included arson.  Vandalism was not defined by the homeowners policy at issue and, therefore, pursuant to the Connecticut rules of construction, the term was given its plain and ordinary meaning.  In doing so, the court looked to Webster's Third New International Dictionary for guidance as the Connecticut courts have historically done.  Webster's defines "vandalism" as "willful or malicious destruction or defacement of things of beauty or of public or private property."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2532 (1986).  Webster's defines "arson" as "the willful and malicious burning of or attempt to burn any building, structure or property of another or of one's own usually with criminal or fraudulent intent."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 122 (1986).  The court noted that the Connecticut Supreme Court, when addressing the underlying facts of a criminal case involving the crime of arson, "appeared to express a view that arson is considered an act of vandalism." See State v. Anonymous, 240 Conn. 708, 694 A.2d 766 (1997).  The court concluded that incendiary fires are included within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "vandalism" and held that the Connecticut Supreme Court would also conclude that arson was "the willful or malicious destruction of public or private property through the setting of a fire as a type of vandalism."  Costabile, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 478.  The court's analysis in Costabile is consistent with the Battishill and Bear River cases, as well as many other cases from other jurisdictions.  See American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Durrence, 872 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that a common sense interpretation of the vandalism and malicious mischief provision would apply to an arson fire); United Capital Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 237 F. Supp. 2d 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing conflicting case law on the issue but agreeing that the ordinary use of the word "vandalism" would include arson); Brinker v. Guiffrida, 629 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("Willfully and intentionally damaging a dwelling by setting it on fire is certainly damaging the dwelling by vandalism and malicious mischief as well as arson."); Estes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that the policy exclusion for vandalism included arson); Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill. v. NCUA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9844 (N.D. Ill. July 12,1996) (holding that the ordinary meaning of vandalism included arson).

However, in Cipriano v. Patron's Mutual Insurance Company, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3577 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2005) (Devine, J.), the Connecticut Superior Court found otherwise and concluded that the term "vandalism" was ambiguous as to whether it included arson under its definition.  The court supported its determination with case law from other jurisdictions. See United Capital Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 237 F. Supp. 2d 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the property insurance policy was ambiguous as to whether vandalism included arson); MDW Enters., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Co., 4 A.D.3d 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that the trial court erred in finding that the exclusion for vandalism included arson and that people generally viewed arson and vandalism as distinct perils); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Furniture, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (holding that the term vandalism was ambiguous as to whether fire fell within the term's definition); Dixon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 2146 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2002) (affirming the lower court's ruling that the definitions of vandalism and malicious mischief did not include arson and that policy covered damages caused by arson).

Although a split of authority exists in Connecticut amongst the trial court level, it appears courts are gradually moving toward the view that a plain and ordinary definition of vandalism includes arson.  This writer believes the analysis performed by the courts in the Costabile, Battishill and Bear River matters, supra, are well reasoned and will provide a sound basis for jurisdictions to move toward a majority view in concluding that the definition of vandalism includes losses caused by arson.